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1 Introduction
Here’s a riddle: A father and son are on their way to the zoo when they get into a
car crash. They are rushed to the hospital and taken to separate operating rooms. A
surgeon rushes into the boy’s room, but upon looking at him, says, “I can’t operate
on this boy; he’s my son!” How is this possible?!
Here’s another: A mother and son are on their way to the zoo when they get into
a car crash. They are rushed to the hospital and taken to separate operating rooms.
A surgeon rushes into the boy’s room, but upon looking at him, says, “I can’t operate
on this boy; he’s my son!” How is this possible?!
The answer to both riddles is that the surgeon is the boy’s other parent. The first
of these is very common. We have never heard the second, despite the fact that it
differs from the first in only one word—‘mother’ instead of ‘father’. Why is this?
Presumably it’s that people who tell riddles think that in the second riddle, we would
come up with the idea that the surgeon is the boy’s father. Apparently it’s much more
difficult to think of a mother being a surgeon. But when asked, “Can a mother be a
surgeon?”, far more people would say “yes” than correctly answer the first riddle.
People’s difficulty answering the riddle illustrates implicit bias. People explicitly
say that mothers can be surgeons, and yet when all that it takes to answer a riddle is to
consider the possibility that a mother is a surgeon, people have trouble doing so. This
may be an example of gender bias—people don’t think of women being surgeons. Or
it may that people have no intellectual problems with women becoming surgeons as
long as those women don’t have children. Of course, there are many kinds of implicit
biases: race, gender, ethnicity, accent, ideology, size, age, and so on.1
Implicit biases are incredibly common. In fact, according to the Kirwan Institute
for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, “Everyone possesses [implicit biases], even people
with avowed commitments to impartiality such as judges.”2
In this paper, we argue that people have an epistemic duty to eradicate at least
some of the implicit biases they have.3 We begin, in §2, by giving a few examples
1One popular test to measure implicit bias is the Implicit Association Test:
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/. Some concerns with the test can be found in Azar (2008).
2See Kirwan Institute for Race and Ethnicity (2015). For more on the pervasiveness of implicit
bias, see Jost et al. (2009).
3This may or may not entail that people also have a duty to identify the implicit biases they have.
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of implicit bias and noting a few important features. In §3, we clarify the notion of
epistemic duty with which we’re concerned. In §4, we offer the main argument:
implicit biases prevent us from fulfilling our other epistemic duties, we ought to
eradicate mental states that prevent us from fulfilling our other epistemic duties, so
we ought to eradicate implicit biases. We conclude in §5 by responding to what we
take to be the strongest objection: we only have duties to do things that are under
our control, and our implicit biases aren’t under our control, so we can’t have duties
to eradicate them. In our view, we have indirect reflective control over our implicit
biases.
2 Implicit Bias
Let’s start with two examples of implicit bias.
Ted: At the age of 22,Will applied for a jobworking as a bank teller after finishing
his bachelor’s degree in Business Administration. He was eventually called in for an
interview with the VP, Ted, which went very well, and Will was offered the job. He
eagerly accepted. His career goal was to work his way up to a branch management
position. He learned quickly, was proactive in taking on more responsibilities and
attending training seminars, always came in on time and never missed work, and was
overall an excellent employee. Every time a promotion came available, Will applied
for the job. But promotions were slow in coming. Will was often passed over for
jobs in favor of people who seemed less qualified. When asked why, Ted couldn’t
point to any particular feature of Will’s resume or interview that threw up red flags,
but Ted mentioned in passing that Will just didn’t quite fit the profile of the role for
which he was applying. But Ted was appalled at the suggestion that it had anything
to do with the fact that Will is black.4
Gina: Gina is a recently tenured philosophy professor at a state school. Much of
the teaching that she does is for a required Introduction to Ethics course. Rather than
lecture, Gina likes to run the course as a kind of guided discussion, regularly throwing
out provocative questions for the students to answer out loud. She has become
frustrated that the women in the class tend to answer these questions with “feelings”
language. She often reminds the women after they speak that in philosophy, reasons
trump emotions. Once a year, her teaching is evaluated by a peer and the department
head. This year, in his evaluation, her peer writes that she mildly chastised a woman
We don’t take a stand on that. People may think that they might have an implicit bias, and thereby
take steps to eradicate it; or they might simply do things that help eradicate the bias without being
aware that they have it.
4This is a fictional story but very similar things happen all the time. See Bertrand andMullainathan
(2004).
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for starting a response with, “I feel that…”, but didn’t do so for a man who started
his answer in the same way just a few minutes before. This surprised Gina, and
so the next few classes she specifically paid attention to how everyone started their
responses. She realized that, contrary to her impression, the men in the class used
feelings language just as much as the women.5
Ted doesn’t explicitly believe that black people shouldn’t be branch managers.
Gina doesn’t explicitly believe that women are more likely than men to use emotive
language when discussing philosophical arguments. And yet both believe and act in
ways that betray biases towards certain groups. These are implicit biases. There are
a number of ways to carve out the difference between implicit and explicit biases.
Perhaps implicit biases are the result of automatic processing, whereas explicit biases
are the result of controlled processing. Perhaps implicit biases are unconscious,
whereas explicit biases are conscious. We won’t take a stand on the correct analysis
of implicit biases, or whether there is a unified analysis.6 But we do conceive of an
implicit bias as a mental state or process, rather than an output, such as a biased
decision or action.7 And one important question that we’ll return to later in section
4 is whether implicit biases are propositional attitudes or not.
If implicit biases are propositional attitudes, then the correct locution is “S’s
implicit bias that p.”8 And the propositions involved can be true or false, so implicit
biases can be described as being true or false. It still would remain a question
whether implicit biases are sui generis propositional attitudes or whether they can
be subsumed under another propositional attitude, like belief.
But implicit biases as propositional attitudes is the minority view. The predom-
inant view in both psychology and philosophy is that implicit biases are something
like associations, presumably between concepts.9 For example, according to Jules
Holroyd (2012), “An individual harbors an implicit bias against some stigmatized
group (G), when she has automatic cognitive or affective associations between (her
concept of) G and some negative property (P) or stereotypic trait (T)...” (p275).
On this view, the correct locution is “S’s implicit association between Fs and Gs”.
5This too is a fictional story. Schwitzgebel (2010) offers a similar example of a racially biased
American philosophy professor, p532. See also Holroyd et al. (2017) p2.
6The interested reader should see Holroyd and Sweetman (2016).
7For more on this distinction, see Holroyd and Sweetman (2016) p81-82.
8See DeHouwer (2014). Some advocate for the view that implicit biases are beliefs of some kind, or
are based on beliefs, and thus have propositional structure: Frankish (2016), p26-29; Mandelbaum
(2016); Hughes et al. (2011), and Mitchell et al. (2009). Schwitzgebel (2013) argues that implicit
biases are “in-between” beliefs. For criticism, see Levy (2015), who argues that implicit biases are
“patchy endorsements”, and see Madva (2016).
9See, e.g., Fazio (2007), Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011), Gendler (2008b) p577, Gendler
(2008a) p641-642, Leslie Ashburn-Nardo (2001), Holroyd (2012), Rydell and McConnell (2006),
Saul (2013b) p244.
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So, the propositional view has it that the implicit racial bias against Will is of the
form, “S’s implicit bias that black people aren’t professional”, whereas the associative
view puts it, “S’s implicit association between black people and unprofessionalism.”
Associations between concepts or predicates aren’t truth-apt, so on this view implicit
biases can’t be true or false. In fact, it’s difficult to see how associations like this can
be evaluated.
What’s important for our purposes is whether we have an epistemic duty to
eradicate implicit bias, and relatedly, whether we have the right kind of control over
implicit bias. The argument we offer is compatible with multiple conceptions of
implicit bias, but partly depends on whether implicit biases are propositional. We
now turn our attention to epistemic duties.
3 Epistemic Duties
There are three important clarifications of the duty we’re arguing for. First, the duty
is epistemic, as opposed to moral, or social, or pragmatic, etc.10 Second, the duty is
robust, as opposed to weak or attenuated in some sense. And third, the duty pertains
to eradicating certain kinds of implicit bias, as opposed to not having such biases in
the first place.
We likely have many duties regarding implicit bias. For example, perhaps we have
a moral duty to not act on an implicit bias if doing so would harm another person.
Maybe we have a social duty to call other people out on their implicit biases when
we notice them. Perhaps we have a professional duty to proactively figure out if we
have implicit biases, the having of which would compromise our ability to do our
jobs well. These are not the duties we are interested in in this paper. The duty we’re
interested in here is epistemic in nature. Epistemic duties are duties that we have
with respect to the epistemic realm—belief, evidence, knowledge, etc. But that’s not
enough to adequately distinguish them, because we might have other kinds of duties
with respect to the epistemic realm, like moral duties. Wemight be morally obligated
to, say, have certain beliefs or acquire certain evidence.
While we don’t have a definitive way to carve out what makes a duty epistemic,
consider some paradigm examples of general epistemic duties that have been put
forward. First, Chisholm (1989) suggests that we have a duty to believe that p if and
only if p is true.11 That is, we ought to: believe that p if and only if p is true. Chisholm
thinks that it’s plausible that this follows from our nature as intellectual beings. It is
10For an argument that epistemic duties aren’t just a special case of moral duties, see Haack (2001).
11This occurs on p14. Roderick Firth (1978) p224 also discusses a duty to believe propositions if
and only if they are true, but he does not ultimately endorse it.
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part of being a believer that we have this duty. But he also thinks that it is merely
a prima facie duty, and often (and perhaps easily) overridden by other duties. One
might have an epistemic duty to φ but a moral duty not to φ, and all things considered
one ought not to φ. Another suggestion is that we have the following epistemic duty:
for every proposition of which I am not certain, I ought to look for more evidence
regarding its truth.12 Perhaps we have an epistemic duty to maximize true beliefs
and minimize false ones.13 Perhaps we have an epistemic duty to maximize justified
beliefs. Perhaps we have an epistemic duty to maximize knowledge. Perhaps we have
an epistemic duty to proportion our beliefs to our evidence.14 Perhaps we have a duty
to cultivate certain epistemic dispositions, like the disposition to believe a proposition
when we know our evidence supports it, or as Sharon Ryan argues in this volume,
the disposition to be open-minded. Perhaps there are many epistemic goals and many
epistemic duties.15
Perhaps we even have epistemic duties to act in certain ways—maybe we have
an epistemic duty to gather evidence. All these are examples of paradigm epistemic
duties, as opposed to duties that are moral or social or pragmatic, etc.16 One way to
think about what unites these examples is that they are duties we have qua believers
or knowers, etc.17 But one could be forgiven for thinking this is circular, and so not
an illuminating analysis of what makes a duty epistemic. Hopefully we have said
enough to distinguish epistemic duties from other duties. Whatever our epistemic
duties are, implicit biases get in the way of fulfilling those duties. So, our duty to
eradicate them is connected with our other epistemic duties. (This argument is the
topic of the next section.)
Our second clarification is that the epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias is what
we’ll call a robust obligation. Robust obligations are such that their violation makes
one blameworthy. If we fail to eradicate implicit bias, then we can be legitimately
blamed for this failure, as long as there are no exonerating or excusing conditions in
place. The idea is that we are responsible for eradicating implicit biases.
This contrasts with a view according to which violation of the epistemic duty
makes the agent in question worthy of, at most, criticism or negative evaluation. On
12See, e.g. Hall and Johnson (1998) and Corlett (2003) p68.
13Truth seems to be a popular epistemic goal. See David (2001) and Hess (2010). For an argument
against the view, see Kvanvig (2005).
14See Stapleford (2012).
15See DePaul (2001) and Kvanvig (2005).
16Of course, for some duties, there is likely some overlap between the epistemic dimension of the
duty and other dimensions. For example, Jennifer Lackey (forthcoming) argues that the source of our
duty to object to things that people say has both an epistemic dimension and a moral one.
17See, e.g. Feldman (1988): “The peculiarly epistemic judgment concerns not practical merits but
rather the propriety of a disinterested believer in [the] situation” (p236).
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this sort of view our epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias is what we might call a
weak obligation.18 In other words, it’s merely a standard for evaluation. Accordingly,
if we fail to eradicate implicit bias, then we can be criticized or judged to have failed
the standard, but not blamed.
Moral duties are paradigm examples of robust obligations: if you violate the duty
not to wantonly harm an innocent person, then you can be legitimately blamed for
this failure. While there are many different accounts of the nature of moral blame, it’s
fairly agreed upon that moral blame has “a characteristic depth, force, or sting” that
goes beyond merely evaluative grading against a moral standard.19 This force can
be explained in many ways, but we cast our lot with those who hold that to morally
blame someone is to place a normative demand on her.20 Moral blame involves a
demand for justification on the basis of moral standards we expect reasonable people
to accept.21 The demand is that the agent acknowledge her moral failure given the
moral reasons she had. As it is with moral blame, so also with epistemic blame,
i.e. blame for violating epistemic duties: blaming someone for violating a robust
epistemic duty involves demanding that the agent acknowledge her epistemic failure
given the epistemic reasons she had.22
In this paper, we do not offer arguments for the existence of robust epistemic
duties. We assume that there are such duties, i.e. that at least some of what
philosophers call “epistemic duties” are not merely standards of epistemic evaluation.
Accordingly, the epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias is not merely a standard of
epistemic evaluation. It’s a robust duty, such that failure to fulfill it merits blame.
It’s important to note that we’re not claiming that all epistemic duties are robust.
Whether an epistemic duty is robust—i.e. whether an agent is blameworthy for failing
to fulfill it—depends on whether the agent has the right kind of control. Weak duties,
i.e. merely evaluative standards, do not require that an agent has control. Suppose
Maya shows up for an open college basketball tryout and stands in the group wanting
to play center. The coach looks everyone over, and her 5’4” height is noticeable. He
says, “If you want to play center, you should be taller.” He has evaluated her as
falling short of the height norm for NCAA centers. This is a legitimate judgment,
18Stapleford (2012) distinguishes “oughts” from “duties” and carves out what he calls a “deflation-
ary sense of ‘ought’ ” (p150, and p172, fn 8). What we’re referring to as a “weak duty” or “weak
obligation” is what Stapleford refers to as a “deflationary ought”.
19See Hieronymi (2004), p116-117. See also Scanlon (1998) p269, Smith (2008) p369, and Smith
(2013) p29, Wallace (1994) p80-81, and Wolf (1990) p40-41, 64).
20See Hieronymi (2004) p117, McKenna (1998), Strawson (1974) p6-7, 14-16, andWallace (1994),
Wallace (2007), Wallace (2010), and Wallace (2011).
21See Smith (2008) p369.
22See Rettler (2018b), p2208-2210 for more detailed discussion of the normative demand inherent
in epistemic blame.
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despite the fact that it is something over which she has no control. However, if Maya
were to deserve blame for failing the NCAA height standard—i.e. if the standard
was a robust duty—then she would have to have control over her height. Similarly,
in order for agents to be subject to the epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias, they
must have control over whether they eradicate such bias.
Our third clarification relates to the specific epistemic duty we defend: that of
eradicating implicit bias. The duty in question is to eradicate implicit biases we
already have. It does not address the question of whether we should have acquired
them in the first place. It may well be the case (although we suspect it is not) that
we have a duty, epistemic or otherwise, to not acquire implicit biases. But that’s
not what we’re concerned with in this paper.23 We now turn our attention to the
argument.
4 An Epistemic Duty to Eradicate Implicit Bias
Our argument proceeds by first noting that implicit biases have a negative epistemic
impact. For example, in Ted, Ted has formed the belief that Will is unqualified for
the job for which he is applying. Ted’s implicit bias has caused him to form this false
and unjustified belief about Will (and likely other black people). In Gina, Gina forms
the belief that her women students are using “feelings language” more than her men
students, which is false and unjustified.
Several philosophers have discussed what are sometimes referred to as the “epis-
temic costs” of implicit bias. Jennifer Saul (2013b) details quite a few. For example,
“shooter bias” can negatively influence our perception (245-246). Implicit biases
lead to inaccurate judgments about the best job candidate, which papers deserve to
be published, and who is a credible witness (246, 248). And in philosophy they can
lead to inaccurate philosophical beliefs, given that they influence which arguments
we accept and reject (247). Implicit bias influences which testimony we accept and
reject, as well, which Saul points out can thus influence our evidence base for various
beliefs (247-249). Uwe Peters (2019) discusses the epistemic costs of what he calls
“ideological bias”—associations between various ideologies and positive or negative
properties—and argues that in combination with other relevant factors, ideological
bias threatens “reliable belief formation and comprehensive knowledge acquisition”
in the field of philosophy (395).
This suggests that implicit biases prevent us from fulfilling our other epistemic
duties — things like believing what’s true, believing what you’re justified in believing,
23The reason we’re not concerned with it is that we don’t think we have the right kind of control
over whether we acquire implicit biases. So, we don’t want to defend this duty.
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not believing what you’re not justified in believing. They cause us to have false beliefs
and unjustified attitudes, they block knowledge and understanding, they cause our
credences to not match our evidence. And we ought to eradicate mental states that
prevent us from fulfilling our other epistemic duties. So, since implicit biases prevent
us from fulfilling our other epistemic duties, we ought to eradicate implicit biases.
Consider a parallel argument that establishes a moral duty to eradicate implicit
biases: Implicit biases have a negative causal impact on our morality. We have
moral duties regarding others’ well-being, our relationships with people, and to
cultivate virtues like justice, compassion, empathy, kindness, and compassion. But
having implicit biases causes agents to violate these moral duties. For example, Ted
consistently passesWill over for jobs for whichWill is better qualified than the person
who gets it; that’s unjust. Gina might well grade women in her class more harshly
than she grades men, since she implicitly associates women with emotive language
and men with rational language. The general argument is that (i) we ought to fulfill
our moral duties, (ii) having implicit biases prevents us from fulfilling our moral
duties, so (iii) we ought not to harbor implicit biases. The conclusion, that is, is that
we (morally) ought to eradicate our implicit biases.
The moral and epistemic arguments have the same structure. Both rely on the
connection between implicit biases and other things—moral or epistemic duties.24 It
is in virtue of this connection that we have a duty to eradicate our implicit biases.
This way of arguing for the epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias is, one might
think, instrumental or relational or extrinsic: it’s bad to have implicit biases because
they cause other bad things. This certainly seems like a reasonable line of argument.
But there’s another potential line of argument; it might also be true that implicit
biases are epistemically bad in and of themselves, i.e. intrinsically.25 This may depend
on whether implicit biases are propositional. If they are—e.g. if they turn out to
be beliefs—then they can be evaluated as true or false, justified or unjustified. In
that case, implicit biases are epistemically bad when they are false or unjustified, in
addition to being epistemically bad when they cause other false attitudes.
If, on the other hand, implicit biases are non-propositional, then they can’t be
evaluated with respect to truth or justification. However, we might still evaluate
them as epistemically bad pairings. In “On being good at seeming smart”, Eric
Schwitzgebel notes that some associations with concept of intelligence seem “good”,
24The argument could also be filled out in terms of moral and epistemic values. We could say that
we ought to pursue things of moral/epistemic value, implicit biases prevent us from realizing things of
moral/epistemic value, therefore we ought to eradicate our implicit biases. We encourage the reader
to use whichever formulation is most persuasive.
25See Kelly and Roedder (2008) for reasons why (in particular, racial) implicit bias is intrinsically
morally bad.
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for example, poise, confidence, giving a moderate amount of detail but not too much,
providing some frame and jargon, etc., but others are not: “whiteness, maleness, a
certain physical bearing, a certain intellect.”26 Other pairings that seem epistemically
bad (even if not false), include associating black people with violence, women with
timidity, children with insignificance, people of certain regions or religions with lack
of intelligence. We can call these pairings “epistemically inapt”. Perhaps, as Daniel
Kelly and Erica Roedder suggest, we can also evaluate implicit biases with respect
to rationality depending on whether the association between concepts “accurately
reflects a correlation or statistical regularity that holds among those referents of the
concepts” (p529).
So, at the very least we have a duty to eradicate implicit biases because of their
negative epistemic impact. But perhaps we have an additional motivation for the
duty, if implicit biases themselves are either false, irrational, or in some other way
inapt. This parallels what we might say about why we ought not to have a false belief
(if one thinks we have such a duty): because it’s inaccurate—it fails to represent the
world correctly—but also because it causes other epistemically bad attitudes.
But it seems that not all implicit biases have extrinsic negative epistemic impact
as a matter of necessity. As Jennifer Saul (2013a) notes, “one might unconsciously
associate groups with different flavors of ice cream without this having any negative
effects” (p40, fn 4). Or the impact of the implicit bias might be what we could
call “epistemically neutral”. For example, implicit biases can sometimes cause
agents to confabulate explanations of our decisions and actions, which might well
be considered a negative epistemic impact. However, Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2014)
argues such confabulatory explanations might sometimes be epistemically innocent.
In these sorts of cases, the implicit bias does not have a negative, but rather, a
neutral epistemic impact. Additionally, an implicit bias might have positive epistemic
impact. Consider an example from Uwe Peters: “the implicit ... negative evaluation
and exclusion of some political view-points (e.g., extreme right-wing positions) and
their advocates is arguable epistemically ... beneficial for philosophy” (2019, p395).
Accordingly, we do not claim that agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit
biases that are apt and have no negative epistemic impact.
Some implicit biases are epistemically worse than others—namely those with
greater negative epistemic impact. Therefore, the duty to eradicate these biases is
stronger—i.e. more important—than the duty to eradicate other less epistemically
problematic biases. Which biases are worse than others is relative to the agent in
question, and depends on her other beliefs, what she attends to, her professional
sphere, her personal sphere, etc. For example, as professional philosophers it is
26See Schwitzgebel (2010) and a discussion in Saul (2013a), p53-54).
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epistemically worse for us to hold a bias against women in philosophy than it is for
a person working the front desk at a hotel, because we hold many more beliefs that
are likely to interact with the bias against women in philosophy (e.g. an association
pairing women with being less capable of rational argument). So an implicit bias
against women in philosophy will lead to more epistemic error in a philosopher than
in a person working the front desk at a hotel. Thus the professional philosopher has a
stronger epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias against women in philosophy, than
the front desk clerk.27
We’ll conclude this section by noting that it might be the case that people have an
epistemic duty to eradicate at least some implicit biases that actually have no negative
epistemic impact. Here’s why. Most of us have the sense that we shouldn’t be able to
avoid fulfilling duties purely as a matter of luck. For example, we have a duty not to
drive while drunk. If someone is driving drunk and is lucky enough to not encounter
another person on their whole trip, we do not say that they aren’t blameworthy for
their actions. They still violated a duty; they just got lucky. If there had been a person,
they may well have killed them. And in plenty of nearby possible worlds, they do
just that.
Similarly, we shouldn’t be able to avoid epistemic duties purely as a matter of luck.
If someone has an implicit bias against black people but never meets a black person
and so doesn’t form false and unjustified beliefs about that person, we do not say that
they aren’t blameworthy for having that bias. They still violated an epistemic duty.
If they were to meet a black person, they’d form false and unjustified beliefs about
that person. And in plenty of nearby worlds, they do just that. So maybe an implicit
bias’s having an actual negative epistemic impact isn’t necessary for us to have a duty
to eradicate it.
5 Control over Implicit Bias
We’ve argued that we have an epistemic duty to eradicate at least some implicit biases.
But consider the following objection: if it turns out that we don’t have control over
them, then we can’t be subject to a duty to eradicate them—even if it’s true that
having implicit biases has negative epistemic impact. A major part of defending the
27Note that this is not a question of a professional obligation. Which professional duties a person
has are relative to a person’s profession, and agents can have professional duties to believe certain
things. For example, a surgeon has a professional duty to believe correctly about the best surgical
procedures and devices. Similarly, philosophers have a professional duty not to discriminate against
women in philosophy, which is a duty which professional chefs do not have. But we’re not talking
about professional duties here; we’re talking about biases that are worse for a philosopher to have
given their greater potential for negative epistemic impact.
L. Rettler and B. Rettler 11
epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias is to respond to this objection—to show that
we have the right kind of control over implicit biases, such that we can fulfill this
duty. Here’s a formalization of what we’ll call the Control Challenge:
1. If agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias, then they have
control over whether they eradicate implicit bias.
2. It is not the case that agents have control over whether they eradicate implicit
bias.
3. Therefore, agents do not have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias.
We grant (1); we think that having a duty to do something requires that the agent
have some kind of control over that thing. As we explained in §4, the kind of duty
we’re concerned with is such that failure to fulfill it can engender legitimate blame.
The sort of control that satisfies the control condition for robust duty thus has at
least two features: (a) it enables the agent to fulfill or not fulfill the duty, and (b) it
enables the agent to respond to blame were she to fail the duty.28
That leaves us with the task of rejecting (2). (2) seems initially plausible because
implicit biases seem like the kind of thing we don’t have control over. As mentioned in
§2, if implicit biases are the result of automatic processing, then they occur regardless
of whether the agent is attending to them. Moreover, on some understandings of
implicit bias, people are not even aware that they have them. And if they’re not
aware that they have them, how could they control them? So Jennifer Saul (2013a)
argues, “we should abandon the view that all biases against stigmatised groups are
blameworthy ... [because a] person should not be blamed for an implicit bias that
they are completely unaware of, which results solely from the fact that they live in a
sexist culture” (p55, emphasis in original). Lack of awareness suggests (though does
not entail) a lack of control, which in turn rules out legitimate blame.
Given our lack of awareness of implicit biases, it seems that introspection doesn’t
help us correct for them.29 For example, reflecting on whether you have an implicit
bias that associates women with emotionalism or a bias that associates black men
with unprofessionalism will not necessarily reveal to you whether you have that bias.
28There may well be attenuated forms of blame that do not require control, such as blaming the
weather for ruining one’s picnic, but again, that’s not the kind of blame involved in violating the
epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias.
29“Neither introspection nor honest self-report are reliable guides to the presence of such mental
states, and one may harbor implicit biases that are diametrically opposed to one’s explicitly stated and
consciously avowed attitudes” Kelly and Roedder (2008) p532). See also Holroyd (2012), p275. See
Ballantyne (2015), p150 for helpful discussion of the relation between bias and introspection.
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Additionally, it seems that implicit biases are not directly responsive to reflection.30
Even if you come to realize that you have an implicit bias associating women
with emotionalism and you explicitly believe that women are not emotional, your
implicit bias does not automatically come into alignment with your explicit belief
just by reflecting on the matter.31 This resistance to reflection makes implicit biases
particularly insidious. Another reason why implicit biases seem out of our control is
that they seem to reoccur despite intentional efforts to eradicate them.32
We grant all of these points. But we think that what these considerations show
is that implicit biases are not under our direct control. Specifically, we cannot form
an intention regarding our implicit biases and then directly or immediately carry out
that intention.33 However, these considerations do not show that implicit biases are
not under our indirect control. And we don’t think that direct control is necessary
for being subject to the duty to eradicate implicit bias.
We have many moral obligations regarding things over which we lack direct
control: the duty to keep our promises, to be a good friend, to take care of the
environment, to refrain from wantonly harming others, and so forth. None of these
duties can be fulfilled directly.34 Instead they are fulfilled indirectly by carrying out
intentions to do other things. For example, for Duncan to carry out the intention
to be a good friend, he must carry out intentions to spend time with his friends, to
listen to them, to help them when they’re in need, to say kind things to them…So,
it seems that with respect to moral duties, while direct control is sufficient to satisfy
the control condition for being subject to a duty, it is not necessary. Instead agents
can be subject to a duty even if they only have indirect control over fulfilling it.
Now consider epistemic duties. If we are subject to robust duties regarding
our beliefs—i.e. if failure to comply with various doxastic duties makes agents
blameworthy—then we must have control over our beliefs. But as William Alston
has famously argued, we lack direct control over our beliefs—we cannot believe that
30See Holroyd (2012), p275.
31See Gregg et al. (2006), and Levy (2016), p20 for discussion.
32See Huebner (2009), Follenfant and Ric (2010), Macrae et al. (1994), and Holroyd (2012) p283
for more discussion of this “rebound effect”.
33As Neil Levy (2016) puts it, we lack control that is “exercised in the service of an explicit intention
(to make it the case that such and such)” (p8-9, emphasis in the original).
34For additional examples of things for which we hold agents responsible but over which we lack
direct control, see Holroyd (2012) p284-285, Rettler (2018b) p2212-2213, and Smith (2005). Not
all of their examples are examples of duties, but rather responsibility more generally. For example,
Holroyd points out that we hold individuals responsible for cultivating various virtues though we only
have indirect control over such cultivation. It’s unclear whether we have a duty to cultivate virtue.
But regardless, the same considerations regarding control apply: we are held responsible for failing to
cultivate virtues even though we only have indirect control over doing so; we have a duty to cultivate
virtues even though we only have indirect control over doing so.
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p as the direct result of an intention to believe that p.35 However, like moral duties,
there is no reason to think that direct control is required for doxastic duties, so long
as we have the right kind of indirect control over our beliefs.
Some have argued that we have a different kind of direct control over our beliefs
that we might call reason-based, rather than intention-based. Instead of carrying
out intentions regarding our beliefs, we control our beliefs by believing directly in
response to various reasons and evidence.36 It might seem that we can appeal to this
“reason-responsiveness” as a form of direct control that satisfies the control condition
for epistemic duties regarding belief. However, reason-responsiveness is not the right
sort of control to appeal to in order to help explain why we are blameworthy for
failing to comply with epistemic duties, because the kind of control that grounds
blame must be reflective. And reason-responsiveness is not reflective.37 (More on
this below.)
In any case, appeal to reason-responsiveness seems even less plausible with respect
to implicit biases, given that they are not responsive to reasons in the way that
explicit beliefs are.38 As noted above, our implicit biases do not necessarily reflect
our rational judgments, and in fact often conflict with them. If Gina were to consider
her reasons for believing that women are more likely to use feelings language than
men, and conclude on the strength of the evidence that this claim is false, such a
conclusion would not necessarily overturn her implicit association of women with
emotionalism.
However, though we lack direct intention-based control over our beliefs, and
though reason-responsiveness does not satisfy the control condition for legitimate
blame, one of us has argued elsewhere that we do have a form of indirect control
over our beliefs that does satisfy the control condition: indirect reflective control. An
agent has indirect reflective control over whether she believes that p if and only if
she can actively engage in critical reflection that causally influences whether or not
she holds the belief that p.39 The reflection involved is critical because it is second-
order reasoning involving conceptualization of reasons as such, and conceptualiza-
35Alston (1988) p263-277, and see Rettler (2018b) p2212 for discussion of the argument.
36For various versions of this kind of view, see Ryan (2003) and Steup (2008), Steup (2011), Steup
(2012), both of whom refer to their views as “doxastic compatibilism.” See also Hieronymi (2006) and
Hieronymi (2008) p362-363; Shah (2002) p443); Smith (2000) p40-46 and Smith (2005) p236-271;
and Weatherson (2008) p546).
37Or at least, that’s what one of us has argued and the other believes on the strength of that
argument. See Rettler (2018b) p2213-2217.
38Even those who hold the view that implicit biases are beliefs do not advocate that they are as
responsive to reasons as explicit beliefs. They are at best, minimally responsive. See Mandelbaum
(2016) p645; and Kelly and Roedder (2008) pp528-529; and Holroyd (2012) p295.
39See Rettler (2018b) p2217 and Rettler (2018a) p103.
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tion of support relations between propositions and between our attitudes toward
those propositions. This contrasts with what is sometimes called “merely first-order
reasoning”. And the reflection involved is active in that an agent forms and executes
intentions to do the mental actions that compose reflection. Engaging in reflection
makes a causal difference to whether we have various beliefs, thus giving us indirect
influence-based control over those beliefs. For example, we can ask ourselves various
questions and try to answer them: “what are my reasons for believing p?”, “are
these good reasons?”, “is there any relevant evidence I haven’t considered?”, and
so forth. We can direct our attention to various reasons, try to remember relevant
data, reconstruct arguments, etc. All of these mental actions are part of reflection,
and doing them causally influences what we believe (Rettler 2018b, p2217). This
kind of control is both necessary and sufficient to satisfy the control condition for
legitimate blame. It enables an agent to respond to the demand inherent in blame,
which is a demand to acknowledge one’s failure. Without the capacity to actively
engage in reflection that causally influences one’s beliefs, an agent would not be able
to understand or respond to blame (Rettler 2018b, p2216).
We think that this kind of control is something we also have over many of our
implicit biases—indeed, over all the implicit biases we can be blamed for failing
to eradicate. However, the relationship between reflection and implicit bias is not
as tightly linked as the relationship between reflection and belief; our control over
implicit bias is even more indirect than our control over belief. With respect to
believing that p, reflecting on the evidence for p influences whether we believe that p.
But as we have seen, this is not necessarily the case with implicit bias: reflecting on
whether women are more emotional than men will not necessarily overturn Gina’s
implicit bias associating women with emotionalism.
However, some empirical research indicates that reflection on arguments suitably
related to the group that one is implicitly biased against can have an impact on
whether one harbors the bias. Briñol et al. (2009) conducted a series of experiments
designed to test the impact of argument evaluation on implicit biases (what they call
‘automatic evaluations’), and they found that reflection on strong arguments does
indeed make a difference to implicit biases.40 In one particular experiment, differing
participants were offered either strong or weak arguments in favor of integrating
more African-American professors into a university. Additionally, some were given
additional prompts to encourage more thoughtful reflection on the arguments. When
tested for implicit bias against black people, those given stronger arguments measured
as having less implicit bias than those given weaker arguments. Moreover, the dif-
ference between the strong and weak argument groups was even greater between the
40See p291-297. See also Mandelbaum (2016) p640-641 for discussion.
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groups prompted to think more carefully about arguments. These findings provide
reason to think that reflection on strong arguments that cast the group one is biased
against in a positive light make a difference to whether we have the biases. Thus,
while Gina might not be able to eradicate her implicit bias by reflecting on reasons
to not have it, it would help eradicate it if she were to reflect on (for example) strong
arguments in favor of trying hard to recruit more women as philosophy majors.
Additionally, there seems to be evidence that implicit biases are causally related
to various explicit beliefs and values. Insofar as reflection can causally influence
these beliefs and values, reflection can causally influence whether we harbor implicit
biases. Jules Holroyd argues that the manifestation of implicit bias is influenced by
our explicit beliefs and values (2012, p288). For example, according to Holroyd’s
interpretation of Devine et al. (2002), “Individuals who are highly committed to
responding without prejudice, for its own sake (and not rather or also for reasons of
social pressure or norms), manifest significantly less negative race bias across a range
of texts for implicit biases” (p288).41 Though this research is concerned with control
over whether wemanifest our implicit biases, as opposed to control over whether we
have implicit biases, the same idea applies to both having and manifesting bias. There
are certain beliefs and values, the having of which influences whether we continue
to have an implicit bias. Voluntarily engaging in reflection makes a difference to our
beliefs about values, as well as to our values themselves. And insofar as engaging in
reflection has this indirect influence on beliefs and values that are causally related to
implicit bias, it has an indirect influence on implicit bias.
Consider an example of this influence. Jennifer Saul (2013a) argues that “The
view that traits are fixed makes one more prone to stereotype endorsement and to
implicit bias. If intellectual ability is viewed as a more complicated set of abilities
and skills, both of these problematic phenomena are reduced” (p53).42 Voluntarily
engaging in reflection on the proposition that traits are fixed causally influences
whether one believes this proposition, which in turn causally influences whether one
has various implicit biases.
The above considerations involve reflection—on arguments, on the content of
various beliefs, and on values. This reflection makes a difference to whether we
harbor implicit bias. But empirical research also shows that there are various other
actions we can take that make a difference to whether we harbor implicit bias—
41See also Levy (2016) p. 20 for discussion.
42Saul even explicitly encourages philosophers to reflect on this point “...because it seems to me
that philosophers are very prone to claims about “who’s smart” and “who’s stupid” ” (p. 53). Such
encouragement supports the view that reflection is something we can actively engage in, and that such
reflection can make a difference to whether agents harbor implicit bias against women and against
women in philosophy.
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various techniques that have been proven to help individuals rid themselves of their
implicit biases.
One such technique is interacting with other social groups; the more people spend
timewithmembers of groups other than their own, the less biased they appear to be.43
Additionally, long term exposure to individuals that counter stereotypes can help
remove implicit bias.44 Another is “approach training”. People are asked to push
a button when they see a stereotype depicted on a television screen. After spending
some time doing this, they measure as having less implicit bias than beforehand.45
Another technique is showing pictures of admired people in a group that the subject
is biased against and disliked people in a group that the subject is biased towards.46
Yet another technique is to have light-skinned people interact in virtual reality as
dark-skinned virtual bodies.47 Finally, diversity education lowers implicit bias.48
When discussing implicit bias against women in philosophy, Jennifer Saul identi-
fies the existence of stereotypes as part of the cause of implicit biases, and she argues
that anything done to break down those stereotypes helps “alleviate the problem”
(2013, p. 50). There are many ways to break down stereotypes. For example, Ted
could hire Will, praise Will’s work to others, make sure the photos in the bank and
on its website feature black bankers, and things like that.
Empirical research shows that doing these sorts of things influences whether one
harbors implicit bias. We might conclude as Holroyd (2012) does, that we have
what she calls “long-range” control over many of our implicit biases (p286-288).49
We have this long range control over whether we eradicate implicit bias insofar as
we can over time carry out intentions to do various things which then results in
eradication of implicit bias.
But notice that long range control is a form of intention-based control: an agent
controls whether she does X by carrying out an intention to Y, which then over time
results in her doing X. For example: an agent controls whether she harbors implicit
bias B, by carrying out an intention to engage in approach training which over time
results in eradicating B. But, we argue, long-range control by itself is not sufficient
to satisfy the control condition for robust duties. If one is subject to a robust duty,
then one can be legitimately blamed for failing the duty. But such blame is only
43See, e.g., Amir (1969), Cook (1985), Brewer and Miller (1988).
44See Dasgupta (2013), and Levy (2016) p. 6 for discussion.
45See, e.g., Kawakami et al. (2007), Phills et al. (2011a), Phills et al. (2011b), and Madva (2017).
46As in Nilanjana Dasgupta (2001).
47See Peck et al. (2013).
48See Rudman et al. (2001).
49Though Holroyd thinks the evidence more strongly supports the idea that we have long range
control overmanifestation of implicit biases, rather the having of such biases. See also, Alston (1988),
pp274-277 for a discussion of what he calls “indirect long-range voluntary control” over our beliefs.
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legitimate if one has the kind of control that enables one to both satisfy the duty and
to understand and respond to blame in case one fails the duty. To be able to respond to
blame, agents must be able to acknowledge their failure, which requires the capacity
for reflection. Suppose Gina fails to eradicate her implicit bias against women. She
can’t be blamed for failing to do so on account of the fact that she could have engaged
in approach training, unless she can also recognize as a reason to engage in approach
training that it will help eradicate her implicit bias. Without the ability to grasp this
connection between approach training and eradicating implicit bias, Gina can’t be
held responsible for failing to eradicate her implicit bias via approach training. And
to make this connection, Gina must have the capacity for reflection. In other words,
she must be capable of engaging in reflection on whether to do approach training as
a method to eradicate her implicit bias. Note that she doesn’t have to in fact engage
in such reflection; she just has to be capable of doing so. If she is not, then she can’t
be blamed for her implicit bias given her failure to engage in approach training. And
the same is true for any actions or activities that make a difference to whether she
harbors implicit bias.
Note also that Gina doesn’t need to be aware of approach training as a method for
eradicating her implicit bias. To be held responsible for failing her duty to eradicate
her bias, it’s enough that she could become aware of the various methods that would
enable her to satisfy her duty. There are a number of things that it’s plausible that
agents must be able to be aware of in order to be subject to the epistemic duty to
eradicate implicit bias: for example, that one has an implicit bias or that it’s likely
or possible that one does, that one has an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias,
that implicit biases have negative epistemic impact, that there are various methods
one can implement to help eradicate one’s implicit bias, and so forth. To be able to
become aware of these things, there must be evidence available to the agent, and she
must be able to recognize and evaluate it. To the extent that an agent cannot become
aware of these things—whether because the evidence out there is very difficult to
acquire or because the agent has a hard time recognizing or evaluating it—the agent
is not as blameworthy for failing to eradicate her implicit bias.50
To summarize: there are two ways in which we have indirect reflective control
over whether we harbor implicit biases. One is that we can actively engage in
reflection on particular arguments, as well as various beliefs and values that we hold,
and this reflection causally influences whether we harbor various implicit biases. The
other is that we can actively engage in reflection on various techniques that help
eradicate implicit biases, and this reflection makes a difference to whether we engage
50Alternatively, one might hold that if an agent is incapable of the requisite awareness, she is to that
extent not subject to the duty.
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in these activities, which in turn makes a difference to whether we harbor various
implicit biases. Again, it’s not that agents have to actually reflect in these ways in
order to be said to have indirect reflective control; but rather it’s that agents are
capable of such active reflection.
The control that we have over implicit bias is even more indirect than our control
over our beliefs. The more indirect (or mediated) our control, the less blameworthy
we are for our failures; we don’t hold an individual as responsible for her implicit
biases as we do her explicit ones. For example, the explicit belief that black men are
more likely to commit crimes than white men, is something which we have indirect
reflective control over and thus can be blamed for, given that our evidence does not
support it. Voluntarily engaging in reflection on the evidence for this claim makes
a difference to whether we believe it. But since reflection on the evidence for the
claim doesn’t necessarily make a difference to whether we harbor an implicit bias
associating black men with crime, our reflective control over the bias is more indirect.
It’s mediated by reflecting on things not directly related to the content of the bias, such
as other beliefs and values, and techniques for eradicating implicit bias. Given this
mediation, it will often be the case that it’s hard for agents to exercise control in these
ways, and to the extent that they don’t have indirect reflective control, they are not
blameworthy for failing to eradicate their implicit biases.51 We think this fits with
our intuitions about blame for implicit bias: we are not as blameworthy for implicit
bias as we are for explicit bias, because our control over implicit bias is more indirect
than our control over explicit bias.
Ultimately, the question of whether we in fact have indirect reflective control over
our implicit biases is an empirical one. But as we have noted, there is empirical data
suggesting that with respect to many of our implicit biases, we have what amounts
to indirect reflective control over whether we harbor them.
6 Conclusion
Implicit bias is widespread. We have argued that we have an epistemic duty to
eradicate implicit biases with negative epistemic impact. This is because implicit bias
prevents us from fulfilling other epistemic duties, and it is perhaps also intrinsically
bad. But we only have this duty, it seems, if we have the right kind of control over
implicit biases. That control, we argued, is indirect reflective control. If it turns
51There are two ways to understand the impact of an agent’s lack of control over X on the agent’s
duty with respect to X: lack of control might entail that the agent is therefore not subject to a robust
duty regarding X, or it might entail that though she is subject to the duty, she is not blameworthy for
failing to fulfill it.
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out that we have this kind of control over our implicit biases—and we’ve offered
empirical evidence that we do—then we have a robust epistemic duty to eradicate
them, and we are thus blameworthy if we fail to do so.52
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